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OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
TAMAR FRANKEL*

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and
the tension between practitioners and theorists.1 Judges do not cite
theoretical articles often;2 they rarely "apply" theories to particular
cases. 3 I do not revisit these arguments. Instead I explore the
working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners and
theorists.
Part I of this Article tells a story about solving a legal issue using

our intellectual

tools-theory, practice,

experience and "gut."

and their progenies:

Part II elaborates on the nature of theory,

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am thankful to Dean Ronald Cass
and my colleagues, Professors Wendy Gordon and Ward Farnsworth, for their insightful
comments to this Article.
1. See generally Stephen F. Williams, Limits to Economics as a Norm for Judicial
Decisions,21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39 (1997) (arguing that economics is not descriptive and
value neutral, and objecting to the use of economics as a guide to the law); see also Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MiCH. L. REv. 34, 35 (1992) ("I see no reason why law professors should write mediocre
economics, or philosophy, or literary criticism, when arts and sciences professors could be doing
a better job[], and as long as other law professors continue to do 'practical' work."). For a
description of the conflicts on the subject see Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and
Legal Practice:Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudenceof Law and PracticalApplications,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996).
2. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Law Is a Sometime Autonomous Discipline,21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 95, 97 (1997) (stating that judges read many articles but do not cite many; lawyers
do not present law and economics arguments in courts; similarly, law and economics is aloof of
the process and substance of the law); see also Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social
Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 106 (1997). Posner examines a theoretical model and
writes that in practice the model has little use. When courts interpret precedents they face the
question of whether the precedents are standards or rules. The model does not help resolve
their issues. Instead courts engage in a kind of practical reasoning, then follow precedents. Id.
3. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACITrIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION (1983); see also Norma Thompson, The Decline and Repudiation of the
Whole: Notes on Aristotle's Enclosure of the Pre-Socratic World, in 37 THEORY & PRAC. 19, 25
(Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds., 1995) (describing the view that practice is nothing
more than the application and implementation of theories). Thompson writes that theories are
the generalizations and practice is the items that fall within these generalizations. In this view
there is no theoretical basis for any practice except that developed by theoreticians. This was
also Aristotle's view: "Aristotle encourages us to associate theory with the divine and practice
with the human." Id.
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practice, experience and gut. Part III of the Article discusses theories
that are helpful to practitioners and those that are less helpful. I
conclude that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice. They use
these intellectual tools differently because the goals and orientations
of theorists and practitioners, and the constraints under which they
act, differ. Theory, practice, experience and gut help us think,
remember, decide and create. They complement each other like the
two sides of the same coin: distinct but inseparable.
I.

CREATING A BANK

GIC

My story relates to the creation of bank Guaranteed Interest
Contracts or GICs, as they are called. In the early 1980s I served
part-time as a consultant to Bankers Trust Company, New York. In
the bank I was a practitioner, but many staff members viewed me as
an academic-not necessarily a compliment. I remember my work on
GICs with fondness because it helped me "earn my wings" and
become one of the group.
GICs emerged with the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 4 Before ERISA, employers could pay their
retired employees the promised lifelong pensions from corporate
profits, year by year.5 But if employers became insolvent, retirees,
some of whom worked for forty years believing they had a secure
retirement, found themselves unsecured creditors and received nearly
nothing. Congress reacted to the failure of one very large employer
by passing ERISA. 6 The Act requires employers to fund their future
pension obligations, that is, to put aside reserves. 7 Therefore, pension
plans consist of two periods: a pay-in period during the employees'
work years, in which employers contribute to the reserve fund and the
money is invested, and a payout period, in which retiring employees
receive pensions from the reserve fund.8 Most employers use the

4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 93, at 533 (1994), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4652.
6. See Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans: Hearing on S. 1575 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 89th Cong. 8 (1966) (noting that after a Studebaker plant closed, assets in a
pension fund provided only some workers with pension rights they had earned, and many
workers received nothing).
7. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
8. See Roger F. Smith, Your Pension Promise,FIN. EXECUIVE, Nov. 1992, at 28.
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reserve funds to buy lifelong insurance annuities for their retired
employees.9
In the late 1970s, insurance companies began to offer employers
a funding mechanism for the pay-in period.10 These are the GICs.
Under the GICs, insurance companies (1) accepted from employers
the employers' contributions to the reserve fund; (2) paid out all
pensions, and death benefits; and (3) paid to the pension plan a fixed
interest on the net amounts that the insurance companies held."
For the insurance companies these were lucrative arrangements.
Bankers Trust's personnel wanted to offer the same contracts to their
customers-employers. However, the general opinion was that GICs
are insurance, and banks are not allowed to offer this type of
12
insurance.
I was presented with a problem: Is there a legal way for the bank
to enter the GICs market? A difference between a practitioner and a
theorist comes to light at this point. I did not look for the problem; it
came to me; it appeared on my desk. As a theorist I could have
chosen this problem, but I was free to look for another interesting
issue. An additional difference between the roles of a theorist and a
practitioner emerges. As a practitioner I sought a way for Bankers
Trust to offer and issue GICs. Failure to find a way would have
meant a disappointment, or even have been considered a personal
failure. In contrast, as a theorist, it would have made no difference to
me whether my conclusions and analysis led to one result or another.
The orientation of my "practitioner self" was to seek a concrete result
and solve the problem for the bank. The orientation of my "theorist
self" was to seek the truth regardless of the effect on the bank. To be
sure, both "selves" must convince others of the correctness of their
conclusions. But at Bankers Trust, I had to convince my general
counsel, the Banking Commissioner, and perhaps the courts. As a
theorist I would have had to convince my colleagues. These

9. See Milton Zall, Understandingthe Risks to Pension Benefits, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1992,
at 62.
10. See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 607, 645-46 (2000).
11. 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 9.4 (1991). These contracts were usually
limited to three years. Only the first year was "open" to payments and disbursements. The next
two years were closed. At the end of the two years the insurance companies repaid the money
with interest.
12. See N.Y. State Ass'n of Life Underwriters, Inc. v. N.Y. State Banking Dep't, 83 N.Y.2d
353, 363 (1994).
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audiences do not always follow the same criteria for correctness nor
do they reward in the same coin.
Returning to the story. It soon became clear that I had not one
but two problems. One problem was whether GICs were insurance
contracts, reserved exclusively to the insurance industry and
prohibited to anyone else. The other problem was whether, even if
GICs were not reserved to the insurance industry, the offering of
GICs was an activity permissible to banks. This second question
arose quickly, as a result of experience. Experience comes with
practice. Practice involves repetition. For anyone working in a
bank's legal department in the 1980s, the question of bank powers
was a recurrent theme.13 Therefore, the question surfaced immediately. A theorist without practice-based experience in this area of
law might have asked the same questions only after more, and
perhaps extensive, research. Further, experience did not merely help
me pose the questions; it also served to give me a more nuanced
understanding of the issues.

My next step was to meet the bank's staff that proposed the GIC
offering. I asked about the precise terms of the arrangement, and

especially what were the insurance companies' obligations, time
limitations, and financial rewards. Here again experience helped; this
time, experience as a theorist. In the 1970s, I wrote an S.J.D. thesis
on variable annuities.

4

That subject involved distinctions between

insurance annuities and securities, and required an understanding of
insurance. I remembered that insurance laws differentiate between
"insurance contracts," such as life insurance policies and annuities,
that contain contingencies -real
insurance 5 -and
"insurance
13. See, e.g., John P.C. Duncan, The Course of FederalPre-Emption in Federal Banking
Law, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 313 (1999); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Regulatory
Implications of Individual Managementof Pension Fund: The Challenge to FinancialRegulators
Posed by Social Security Privatization,64 BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1068 (1998).
14. Tamar Frankel, VariableAnnuities, VariableInsurance and SeparateAccounts, 51 B.U.
L. REV. 173 (1971).
15. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 2001). A life insurance policy and an
annuity contain a promise to pay upon death or throughout life. In both cases the insurance
company promises payment for an undetermined, contingent period. We do not know when the
life of an insured or an annuitant will cease. Insurance companies are able to make these
promises because even though they do not know when an individual will die, they can ascertain,
based on past statistical data, when a percentage of a group of individuals will die. Thus,
pooling a large number of insureds or annuitants, insurance companies can offer payments to be
terminated or triggered by the death of an individual. In fact, those who buy annuities and die
sooner than the average pay for those who buy annuities and die later than the average. In life
insurance the reverse is true. Those who buy life insurance and die later than the average pay,
and continue to pay premiums, for those who buy life insurance and die sooner than the
average. In addition, the premiums paid on insurance policies and annuity contracts are
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business," such as brokerage and investment advisory services, in
which insurance companies are permitted to engage, but which are
not real insurance. These other businesses do not involve contingencies. Insurance contracts are reserved to the insurance industry.
Insurance business is not reserved to the insurance industry, and
anyone who qualified could engage in that business.
This understanding led to the question: Are GICs insurance
contracts or insurance business? The New York insurance statute did
not explicitly answer the question; neither did the courts or legal
publications and treatises. 16 The only evidence that GICs constituted
insurance contracts was that insurance commissioners said so and that
only insurance companies offered GICs. That was not enough for
me. An examination of the terms of the GICs, as described by the
staff of the bank, led to the conclusion that GICs did not contain
contingencies, but rather consisted of obligations tied to fixed interest
rates and payment dates (including payments on demand). That was
enough for me, but I needed authorities to convince others.
On this issue the history of GICs helped. GICs are the offspring
of group annuities. 7 During the pay-in period, before an employee
retires, the reserve fund from which the employee's annuity will be
paid is augmented by employers' contributions and by investments.
One type of such investment is the GIC. No insurance contingencies
are involved during this phase because no lifelong annuity retirement
payments are made to the particular employees. 8
When insurance companies planned to offer employers such GIC
investments, they viewed GICs as annuities without contingencies. 9
That raised legal uncertainties; the companies were not sure that they
had authority to issue such "contingencies-less" annuities. Therefore,
they asked the New York legislature for a clarification, and received
it. 20 The introduction to the bill that authorized insurance companies
to offer GICs explained the main reason for the legislation-to allow
insurance companies to offer so-called annuity contracts without
invested and part of the investment return inures to the policy and annuity holders, and the
insurance companies retain part.
16. See id. § 1113.
17. See Messagephone, Inc. v. Tex. Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 966
S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. App. 1998) (stating that a "guaranteed interest contract issued to the plan
manager remains an unallocated group annuity contract").
18. See Ariz. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Fund v. Honeywell, Inc., 927 P.2d 806, 808 n.1
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
19. See 1 Frankel, supra note 11, § 9.4, at 368.
20. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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insurance contingencies."' That was sufficient evidence that GICs
were insurance business, and that anyone could offer them.
The second problem involved not only experience, but also the
exercise of gut or "intuition." The question was whether banks could
issue GICs. GICs looked like, and were considered to be, annuities
shorn of their contingencies component. However, an examination of
the way GICs actually worked revealed arrangements under which
insurance companies received money and paid it out on fixed dates or
on demand, under a certain formula, plus a fixed interest rate on the
net amounts held.2 2 Stripped of insurance verbiage, which was linked
historically to annuities, the arrangement emerges under a model. A
model is a species of a theory, a generalization that may include more
than one item. Under the umbrella of this model rests not only GICs
but also bank deposits. GICs do what deposits do. The same pattern
appears in different contexts-an intermediary that receives money
and pays out money with fixed interest on a specified date.
Now the accepted insurance pattern of GICs could be changed to
a banking pattern of a deposit. This exercise is similar to the visual
exercise in which two profiles facing each other can also be viewed as
a vase. It depends on what pattern one focuses to produce the image.
The vision of a GIC as a bank deposit emerged in a similar process.
One unlocked the traditional view to discover whether the basic
features fit another view. They did.
While the insurance analysis was based on experience, which led
to the relevant research, the banking analysis was different. It was
not experience that led to this new view of the transaction, but a
discovery of a pattern-a gut or intuition. These will be described in
more detail in Part II.
The next step was easy: stripping the insurance legalese and
substituting for it the banking legalese. With that done, out came a
deposit that was not merely the equivalent of a GIC, but a banking
GIC. The final step was a visit to the Commissioner of Banking to
reduce the risk of a new venture into uncharted waters, and seek
support against a legal attack by the insurance authorities. The
Commissioner approved with glee: insurance commissioners have
been protecting their turf against banks and others so zealously!
21. 1985 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 311.
22. See Messagephone, Inc., 966 S.W.2d at 138 (citing Jonathan L. Mercier & A. Richard
Susko, Guaranteed Investment Contracts, in LEGAL ISSUES IN PENSION INVESTMENT 291
(Practicing Law Inst. ed., 1981)).
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Banks expanded the use of GICs to other purposes with great
success. 3 Today no one questions their authority and no one argues
that these are insurance contracts. The process of conversion
involved analysis and research based on theory, practice, experience,
and a gut type of pattern recognition.
II. THEORY, PRACTICE, EXPERIENCE AND GUT DECISIONS: How
DO THEY HELP Us THINK, REMEMBER, DECIDE AND CREATE?
This Article does not define theory and practice with utmost
precision. But the following definitions are generally correct and are

sufficient for the purpose of this discussion.
A.

Theory, Practice,and Experience

The dictionary definition of a theory includes words like "analysis," "speculation,"
"principle," "belief,"
"hypothesis," and
"assumption. '24 The thread that connects all these words is critical
5
thinking and generalization-ageneral view of parts of the world.
Thus, the two components of theory are thinking in its various
aspects, and generalization- the recognition of observed or imagined

patterns covering numerous related details.
The dictionary definition of practice includes "exercise," "custom," "habit," "repeat," and "perfect." 26 The thread that connects all
these words is repetition, whether of acting or thinking. Many of the
words defining practice suggest acting on an automatic pilot, so to
speak, with no independent or critical thinking or attention. These
words may denote acting or doing with little mindfulness or attention.
That, however, is not necessarily so. An artist practices the piano
with great attention and concentration. The practice of the law and
23. See Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 993, 996 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("A
[Bank Investment Contract] is the same as a GIC except it is offered by a bank rather than an
insurance company.").
24. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICnIONARY 1223 (10th ed. 1999).
25. Thinking should be distinguished from paying attention, although attention is
important to understanding the meaning of theory. "Attention" is ambiguous in the sense that
it may denote thinking, but not necessarily critical thinking. One meaning of attention is
obedience: attention to the orders or ideas of others. This might lead to doing what others tell
us to do, paying attention to the orders but not thinking at all. Another meaning of attention is
more general and includes "mindfulness" -focus, alertness, thoroughness, care, fascination.
These words would include paying attention not only to the directives of others but also
focusing on one's own thoughts. All these words, however, denote a state of the mind-the use
of thinking in a certain way, but not necessarily thinking in an independent or creative way.
26. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 914.
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medicine in most cases is far from routine.17 Therefore, practice is not

necessarily mindlessness, but it could be.
Practice produces experience, both for practitioners and for
theorists. Experience is gained by repeated activities, including
thinking.

Practice is generally not mere repetition of identical

actions, especially if the actions are complex. Each repeated action
changes the actors and their product, adding to their experience,
which refines their performance and enriches their memory.
B.

Practice,Experience and Theory Are Closer than Seems at First
Blush

Practice is not necessarily devoid of theory. In the story of GICs,
the analysis of insurance contracts required both practice and
experience, as well as modeling and generalization. In fact, practice

also constitutes recognized patterns of actions.2

Practice also

involves creativity. A practitioner discovered the telescope, giving
rise to later sophisticated theories. 29 Thomas Edison innovated by

trial and error-a practitioner's approach-and later his innovations
were further theorized. 30 Theorists also practice. They practice
writing; they practice skimming materials to get to the core of the
substance; they practice judging quickly which conversation will lead
to interesting discussions and which will not; and when they conduct

experiments, they practice the most efficient ways to use assistants
and materials.

Most importantly practice produces generalizations

and theories through the examination of patterns.
acquire recognition by tests in practice.

Most theories

27. In fact, the artist when performing, the lawyer when negotiating a complex deal or
appearing in a difficult case, and the physician when performing heart surgery, are practicing
with enormous mindfulness and attention.
28. If the actions are identical, the pattern-the theory-is not very interesting or useful.
One item could describe all items. But if the items are not identical but similar, a theory can be
interesting and helpful. Thus, "best practices" in industry are theories about recognized
patterns of practices.
29. Hans Lippershey, a Dutch spectacles maker, is traditionally credited with inventing the
telescope. The Estates of Holland first used the invention for warfare. Upon learning of the
invention, Galileo built and adapted a telescope for use in astronomy.
7 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 387 (15th ed. 1993).
30. It is not surprising that many creative lawyers crave an academic environment and
career, while very creative theorists seek to find their questions in the real world.
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Practice,Experience and Theory Are Intellectual Tools for Both
Theorists and Practitioners

Practice, experience and theory provide efficient tools for thinking, remembering, retaining data to be brought up from our memory
banks when needed, and for effective use of attention. With these
tools humans acquire new data and innovative ideas.
We have a limited capacity for memory. Theories help us retain
memory. The items we remember are organized in categories
forming a hierarchy. Thus, in addition to knowledge and understanding, theories create such categories by grouping many items
under the same umbrella, and they help trigger the memory of each
item. Useful theories are simple because they eliminate details that
are not deemed relevant to the related patterns and help us organize
data. In the case of the GICs, for example, it was important to
remember that a salient difference between insurance and other
contracts is the presence of contingencies. That memory surfaced
when we resorted to the general definition of insurance, and the subdefinitions of insurance contract and insurance business. In addition,
and just as important, theories offer ideas and views of the world to
enrich both knowledge and perception.
We have a limited capacity for attention. We are unable to focus
on many things all at once. Practice by repetition and resulting habits
allows actors to do one thing and pay attention to another. A novice
driver must pay full attention to driving, more so than a seasoned
driver, who can drive while listening to music or speaking to the other
passengers. We perform many functions almost automatically,
focusing on these functions only with the appearance of danger
signals. In addition, and just as important, practice produces
experience on which shortcuts to memory and ideas are built, as
described in the following Section relating to gut.
Thus, both theories and practice help increase our database of
knowledge and creativity, but they do so in different ways. Theories
bring ideas that usually come incrementally and are subject to critical
evaluations and continuous revisions. While continuous revisions are
time-consuming, theories can result in fewer serious mistakes. It is
only when a dramatic change occurs that our theories-our structured
thinking-must change. Practice is different. Because we automatize
some of our actions or thoughts, we can pay attention to other things.
Practice-based experience adds to our data banks and feeds our
theorizing. However, in contrast to theorizing, automatic actions and
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thoughts are not re-examined. While practice is more efficient than
theorizing, it may result in significant future mistakes, and when these
are found, habits must change. Practice and theory, however, are not
entirely distinct.

A well-accepted theory acquires the force of

habitual thinking and may be as hard to change as any habit.
Nonetheless, changing a theory involves the habitual tool of critical
evaluation. In that respect, changing habits is harder because it
requires additional critical awareness, which is not involved in gaining
habits by practice.
D. Prototypes of Theorists and Practitioners
The objective, direction, constraints, and risks of theorists and
practitioners differ. Theorists seek to discover interesting, preferably

hidden, problems in our complex and puzzling universe. They strive
to understand and explain these problems, and sometimes to suggest

solutions for them. Theorists offer ideas or hypotheses and prove
them true or false, right or wrong. Regardless of whether they are
correct or convincing, theorists make others (both theorists and
practitioners) think, challenge them, and expand their awareness.3'

In contrast, practitioners rarely invent problems for their own
sake, nor seek hidden ones. The problems practitioners face may be
obvious-a conflict among parties; a draught; an epidemic; political

unrest; a declining corporate profit margin. Practitioners focus on
achieving concrete results in the real world: winning the case,
inducing settlement among the parties; managing the water supply;
finding a cure; seeking an armed or diplomatic solution to the unrest;
or rejuvenating the product and organization of the faltering
corporation. 32 Thus, the focus and objectives of theorists and
practitioners differ.
31. Practitioners use theories. In the case of GICs the practitioners at the bank had to
contend with the far more fundamental policy that divided banking from insurance. As
background for justifying the engagement of banking in GICs they needed to understand the
implications not only for their business but also for the regulators. These justifications involved
the nature of the risks to the bank and the absence of insurance risks, which, at that time, it was
assumed banks were not structured to cover. The theories concerning the nature of banking
and insurance were therefore important to the bank when approaching the Banking
Commissioner for approval of the GICs. Arguably, every regulated industry must draw on
theoretical work on the history, explanation, justifications, and criticism of the regulatory
structure.
32. As mentioned before I did not seek the problem of the GIC. It came to me. But
theorists who found the question interesting produced some work on the nature of insurance
and the nature of banking. Thus, even accounting for gradations and exceptions, one could view
theorists as more likely to raise and focus on interesting unanticipated problems, and
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The constraints under which theorists and practitioners function
also differ. While both strive to complete their projects and both are
subject to deadlines, of the two, theorists have more time to think.
Practitioners must often complete their projects faster, and "think on
33
their feet" with no opportunity to ponder, deliberate, and review.
Some practitioners, such as corporate directors, are under a double
pressure-required by law to be informed and deliberate, yet pressed
by the corporate environment to meet short deadlines. 34 Therefore,
practitioners must use shortcuts to get quick answers and make quick
decisions. To them, generalizations, theories, good organization of
materials and ideas, and other time-conserving mechanisms are
crucial.
Practitioners and theorists act under other constraints. However,
practitioners must achieve results under greater imposed constraints
beyond their control.3 5 A practicing physician's goal of curing
patients is constrained by the patients' physical conditions and
behavior, availability of funds, and sometimes, cultural limitations
and beliefs. Even though judges, like other practitioners, have
options and discretion, judges must reconcile their decisions with
precedents, rules of procedure, and weight of evidence. Their
decisions are subject to revisions by higher courts and the legislatures,
and, within limits, to the norms of their profession and the pressures
of their peers. Lawyers operate under similar limitations, in addition
to financial, competitive, and political pressures.
In contrast, theorists enjoy more freedom than practitioners.
Many a theory is grounded in self-imposed rules, bound by limitations
of the theorists' own making-the ground rules that they establish to
determine true and false, right and wrong. The theories of numbers
and logic are of this sort. 36 Such theories are not amenable to testing
in the real world. Theories exploring right and wrong human
behavior, based on moral, economic, or other principles, are subject
to such "man-made" limiting ground rules; so also are theories
practitioners more likely to offer and focus on interesting and unanticipated solutions to
problems.
33. Arguably, law school classroom discussions and perhaps the examinations offer
students the opportunity to practice thinking on their feet or seat, short-term.
34. The duty of care that fiduciaries must exercise requires obtaining information and
evaluating it, and sometimes discussing it with colleagues.
35. Electricians and billiards players theorize differently from physics experts driven by
different aims.
36. See GOTLOB FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC (2d rev. ed. Northwestern
Univ. Press 1968) (1953).
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exploring the purpose of life, the meaning of death, the nature of the
universe, God, and our relationships to each other. These theories
are shaped and bound by human intellectual and emotional
constructs: reason, faith, and love, and subject to the theorists'
controls. Not all theorists, however, are as free. Theories about how
the world was created require real-world proof or disproof, directly or
indirectly, and are subject to real-world constraints. Similarly,
experiments in genetic engineering are limited by the availability of
genes and legal limits on experiments. These limitations are beyond
the control of the theorists.
Most importantly, theorists are exposed to lesser personal risks
than practitioners. Failures are painful, but the failures of theorists
are often less final. The less "practical" theorists' work is, the less
risk it poses to themselves and to others. Theorists may suffer from
failure to convince their colleagues, but opinions of colleagues can be
wrong or may change. In contrast, practitioners may suffer from
failure to achieve their targets-to win the cases, heal the patients.
These failures are more overt, affect third parties, and are often
irreversible and final. Court cases are lost; the patients die. Thus,
practitioners take greater personal risks than do theorists.
E.

The Uses of Gut

Both practitioners and theorists use gut as a shortcut, timesaving
tool. Presumably, if they had the time, they could explain their
thought process and the reasons for their decisions. This mechanism
is similar to the use of abbreviations, such as USA, and both
practitioners and theorists resort to it.17
More importantly, practitioners and theorists use gut as a
shortcut,pattern-searching,thinking tool in situations within complex,
adaptive and changing systems. In Hidden Order: How Adaptation
Builds Complexity, Dr. John Holland offers the building blocks of a
theory of complex adaptive systems, usually populated by adaptive
agents. 38 Constant adaptation to other adaptive agents and the system
as a whole is the major source of complexity and ever-changing rules
37. This tendency contributes to the development of a language for both practitioners and
theorists, which makes it difficult for outsiders to judge the correctness of their gut decision, and
may require rationalization, unless outside proof such as winning in the game of chess or
basketball is available.
38. JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY
(1995).
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under which such agents act. Many theories, says Dr. Holland, are
linear, based on the reasoning by "if... then."39 But humans cannot
calculate large, constant variations and probabilities. Further, these
theories are often based on the assumption that past patterns will be
replicated in the future. In many cases these assumptions prove
invalid. Other, more sophisticated assumptions may also prove
invalid. 40
In such situations actors often use gut. They draw on memories
of experienced actions, decisions, and situations. Intuition or gut tells
them which approach worked and which did not.4' In the process they
search for patterns, patterns of patterns, and relationships among
them, and this search often leads to creative decisions and ap42
proaches.
As Dr. Holland notes, agents in a complex adaptive system move
from a rule of "if... then" to a cluster of rules that can then be
automated. 43 The rules are tentative because other rules are also

possible, and the combinations of the rules mainly depend on the
questions asked. Thus, rules that emerge from aggregations of details
can become themselves details to be further aggregated. 4 Adaptation
39. Id. at 15-16.
40. The underlying assumptions of theories by Nobel Prize winners, which predicted
variations once in a thousand years, were proven wrong, leading to the demise of a very large
hedge fund. See NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT 182-224 (2001) (describing and
analyzing the rise and fall of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund); id. at 203
(suggesting that the sources of trouble were the assumptions underlying some of the theories
and the automatic risk management systems adopted by the banks, which were effective for
each bank but devastating for the system as a whole, under certain circumstances).
41. See JEREMY CAMPBELL, WINSTON CHURCHILL'S AFTERNOON NAP 376 (1986). Jerry
Fodor of MIT offers a metaphor of psychological modules, which manipulate complex
information in the brain. Id.
[The modules] may be capable of very elaborate and extremely rapid feats of
computation, but their range of knowledge is restricted. Modules do not know as
much as the brain as a whole knows. Other, 'higher' centers of the brain, such as those
involved in thinking, judging and imagining... share information without
hindrance... [but] are denied access to the internal operations of the modules and
therefore must be content to work with the special representations of the world that
modules provide.
Id. When we are faced with very complex situations involving many items that relate to many
patterns we must break out of single patterns and create a "meta-pattern."
42. See Alden M. Hayashi, When to Trust Your Gut, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2001, at 59,
62-64. Following a reasoning pattern that is also followed by competitors in business or in law
or in any other practice does not work. It is at this juncture that some management personnel,
who are very good, stop at middle management and do not proceed to the top level. That is
why some lawyers remain at the lower level as well. That subconscious is what distinguishes
some people from others.
43. HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 45-50.
44. Id. at 10-12. Cf.Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63 (discussing that decisions on school
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to changes alters the structure, or strategy, of the system, depending
on the system's experience. 45 Agents act by rules, and change their
rules as experience accumulates. 46 Aggregation of rules, categorization of patterns, theories, and models, are ways of simplifying
complex systems by putting similar items together and treating them
as equivalent. We discard details, which we decide are not relevant

for the particular question, and combine the details which we
consider bearing on the question.
Top executives often function by gut, and engage in pattern
searching when complexity is great. Says AOL's Bob Pittman:
You have to figure out what the picture is. What does it all mean?
It's not just a bunch of data. There's a message in there.... Every
time I get another data point I've added another piece to the jigsaw
And then, one day, the
puzzle, and I'm closer to seeing the answer.
47
overall picture suddenly comes to me.

Pittman also says, "'your mind continuously processes information that you are not consciously aware of, not only when you're
asleep and dreaming but also when you're awake.' 48 "Aha" may be49a
reaction to something you read and have a feeling you already knew.
In shortcut thinking, experienced practice-the database pro-

duced by practice-is important to successful outcomes.

The

admissions and decisions by doctors and parole officers "confirm that professional judgment can
often be reduced to... rules").
45. See HOLLAND, supra note 38, at 9 (stating that a biological organism "fits itself to its
environment.... [and] experience guides changes in the organism's structure so that as time
passes the organism makes better use of its environment for its own ends.").
46. See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that gut draws partly on the subconscious to
sort complexity and bring the results to the fore). "[E]xperience enables people to chunk
information so that they can store and retrieve it easily," and helps discern categories of
categories and patterns of patterns. That is how people can look at the same thing-especially if
it is very complex -and see different things each time; as they draw from the same data they see
different patterns. That is how the same legal decision can illuminate different ideas at different
times. Id.
47. Id. at 63. The top manager looks at the data a number of times, and like a scientist he
tries to discern a pattern that is helpful not only to an explanation but also as a basis for a
decision to act. Pittman knew from past experience that sometimes the sale of a product
ancillary to the main focus of the business is where the money is. Thus, in amusement parks
(and movies) most revenue came from selling refreshments and other merchandise, not from
the admission tickets. He used this in another context at AOL.
48. Id. at 61. For an illustration in the world of athletics, see Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez
and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1773-74 (1987). Before a game, a reporter asked
Martinez what words of wisdom his manager told Martinez before the game, and the player
responded: "'He said, "Throw strikes and keep 'em off the bases," ... and I said: "O.K." What
else could I say?"' Fish observes that what the manager and the pitcher know is "either inside
of them or ...beyond them."
49. Hayashi, supra note 42, at 61; see id. at 61-62 (discussing how one CEO places himself
in unusual circumstances working as a janitor).
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experienced chess player dredges from memory the images of
winning and losing chessboard situations. The master chess player
will be right most of the time. A less experienced chess player, having
fewer memories on which to draw, will make wrong moves more
often.
F.

Testing Gut Decisions by Reasoning

Successful gut decisions depend on an evaluation of their result.
If we can determine the correctness of these results easily, then no
more is required, and gut decisions are adopted. But if we cannot
easily test their success, reasoning helps double-check the results.
The converse is also true. Gut can help check the correctness of
reasoning.
For example, a master chess player's gut decision is convincingly
correct because (1) the master is the sole master of the decision, (2)
the chess game movements are unambiguous, are fairly clearly
correlated, and the feedback from the movements is fairly quick and
direct, and (3) the result-winning-is clear and unambiguous.

Similarly, a basketball player alone throws the ball, even though he
acts as a member of a team, his action is visible, and the result (ball
falls within or outside the basket) is unambiguous. In both cases
actors are guided by gut, which is in turn strengthened and enriched
by experience. In both cases the actors cannot, but need not,
accurately articulate and rationalize their decision process.
In contrast, physicians and lawyers who act by gut cannot be as
sure of the correctness of their decision because they rarely act alone;
credit may be due to other than the lawyers' or physicians' contributions. In addition, the details in their complex activity are not
clearly correlated with one another. Further, the results of their
actions are not necessarily directly linked to their decisions. Other
factors can contribute to or detract from successful results. Lawyers
may lose their cases because their clients deserve to lose; patients may
die even if the physicians performed brilliantly, guided by experienced gut.50 The reverse may also be true. Notwithstanding bad
gut decisions, clients could be acquitted and patients may survive.
Thus, the successes of lawyers and physicians do not strengthen their
50. Litigation lawyers rely more successfully on gut in cross-examination perhaps because
notwithstanding the variety of witnesses and subject matter of cross-examination, they have
immediate "feedback" for their questions and lines of inquiry and that strengthens their
memory and gut reactions.
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experience-based gut to the same degree that winnings do for the
chess master and the basketball player. Even if lawyers and
physicians may not be able to fully articulate the reasons for their
decisions, they may try harder to do so.
Theory and reasoning may lead to unacceptable results that must
be checked by gut and intuition. We reject a market theory for
adoption ("market for babies") or a cost-benefit analysis for a rapist
and its victim, or for the prevention of rape.51 Both are examples of
applying simplistic linear theories to highly complex social systems,
such as placing children in adults' care, or relationships among the
sexes.5 2 If we add conditions to the "market for babies" to adjust for
experience and gut, the theory becomes so cluttered with exceptions
as to lose its value as a theory-a general statement of a part of the
universe. In that case experience and gut must take the lead.
While a habit of theorizing and reasoning does not invariably
lead to a correct, sensible, or acceptable solution, gut does not lead to
the promised land either.53 Gut can create a habit of looking for
patterns.5 4 This habit is useful, but must be exercised in moderation.
Always looking for patterns may result in not making any decisions.
The converse is also true. Automatically following what seems like a
rule before the rule's existence is established may result in wrong
decisions. The Washington Post columnist Michael Kelly demonstrates the danger of gut-reliant decisions. 55 After meeting President
Putin, President Bush had this to say: "'I looked the man in the eye; I
found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy.... I was able
to get a sense of his soul.... He's an honest, straightforward man who
56
loves his country. He loves his family. We share a lot of values.'
In a strong reaction Senator Helms noted: "'[President] Putin was far
from deserving the powerful political prestige and influence that
51. The cost-benefit analysis described here is that of the rapist, who may benefit from the
rape more than the cost to the raped. I do not include cases in which the existence of rape is
unclear and where consent is the issue. Neither do I include cases in which the allocation of
enforcement costs of preventing rape are considered as compared to preventing other horrible
crimes. These fringe issues do not mask, however, the fallacy of applying cost-benefit analysis
to those cases where these tests are inappropriate. An attempt to cover all aspects of life by
cost-benefit analysis is self-defeating because to do so the terms themselves must be made so
broad as to become meaningless.
52 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-43 (3d ed. 1986).
53. See CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at 376.
54. See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 63.
55. Michael Kelly, Where Sammy Sosa Meets Vladimir Putin, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001,
at A25, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49343-2001Jun26.html.
56. Id.
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comes from an excessively personal endorsement by the president of
' 57
the United States."
The worrisome thing about President Bush, said Michael Kelly,
is not his mistakes in foreign policy. In fact, he is effective.
No, what is worrisome is that Bush-and in this he seems dangerously to resemble the foreign-policy-disaster-prone John F.
Kennedy-does not seem to understand, or care about, the limits of
gut. He does not seem to want to bother with the tedious business of
study and fact assessment that is the process by which right decisions
are most often arrived at-which is even then not so often. He does
58
not seem to want to work at the thing.
This is precisely the point.
Thus, gut and reason moderate each other. The balance of their
mix varies. When the outcome of decisions cannot be easily judged,
or when actors' judgement is inconsistent and emotions play an
inappropriate part in the decisions, 59 logic and reason must be brought
in as "sanity checks" to help correct mistaken decisions.6 But when
logic and reason run roughshod over gut perceptions, producing
results that "feel very wrong," we should stop to reexamine them.
G.

Judges and PractitionersUse Gut, but Must Rationalize

Judges use gut for the same reason that other actors in a complex
adaptive system use it. Even though judges are bound by precedents,
they choose the precedents to which they analogize new situations,
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Emotions play a role in decisions led by gut reactions. Emotions are essential and
important in honing intuitive abilities to make good decisions. A gut may send its signals even
by a physical sensation. When people "know" that their decision is right their stomach may
tighten, or their skin tingles. While they may compete, "balanced emotions are critical to
intuitive decision making." Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62.
60. Statistical rules often outperform human judgment because they are more consistent;
for example, they do not suffer from human moods. Not all practitioners can utilize gut as much
as top management, although they too must reason and justify their decisions. Judges and
lawyers must reason. Experts are good when they have rules and good categories for
recognizing the indexes. This is how intuition is related to awareness and understanding. A
truly good inspired decision requires cross-indexing; the use of analogies to unrelated fields.
Many theoreticians may have the intelligence but not the gut. Gut leads to some extent to
theories. A theory, followed blind, especially when it is based on highly complex data, is likely
to be wrong, just as a gut has a chance of being wrong. However, theories may help intuition by
highlighting human errors, for example, our tendencies to take risks that are too high in order to
retrieve losses, that is, not knowing when to cut, or seeing patterns where none exist, or feeling
overconfident and at the same time not trusting our intuition. This mix and mixed-up human
emotions can be clarified by theories. See id. at 62.
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such as those involving the Internet, or choose among different
precedents, 61 or among different rationales derived from the
precedents.
However, judges must rationalize their decisions for the same
reasons that other practitioners must.62 First, judges should test their
gut inclinations for correctness by using reasoning.63 Many judicial
decisions are not unambiguously correct. Their short-term and longterm impact may differ; the criteria for correctness of judicial
decisions can be controversial, and their effect on society and on the
litigants cannot be always easily determined. Moreover, judges act
mostly in groups. Unless they dissent, their personal gut decisions are
not publicized and cannot be tested for correctness. 64 Similarly,
practitioners use gut but must rationalize. Like top management,
legal practitioners create for themselves rules, aggregate the rules and
adapt them to changes in their environment and in the behavior of
other agents with whom they interact. Second, like other lawmakers,
judges must communicate to others the reasons for their decisions, to
guide behavior, establish the rule of law, and render the lawmakers
accountable.
A combined use of gut and reason presents a problem of communication. In contrast to the gut timesaving mechanism, and to
rationalization, this process is hard to articulate. 6 For example, a
master chess player looking at the board and contemplating his next
move may find a move that "feels" right, without being able to
61. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism:Richard Posner's Jurisprudence,57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1447, 1450-51 (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990)). Fish notes that Posner's book characterizes the judge's controlling decision as the
"choice as to what the precedent shall be." Fish, supra,at 1451.
62. In addition law must be communicated to the public so that people can follow the rules;
judges must be accountable, to avoid arbitrary and prejudicial decisions.
63. See Fish, supra note 61, at 1451 (suggesting that judges are bound by precedents and
only considerations of policy or ethics justify the exercise of choice among precedents).
64. The correctness of the decisions of a particular court or judge may be evaluated by the
size of their following, and by their conversion from decisions on the particular facts to general
rules and principles; that is, to theories. In this respect judicial decisions are similar to theories.
See KARL P. POPPER, OBIECrVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 13 (2d rev.
ed. 1979) (stating that theorists desire to show truth and "can never justify empirically" their
theories, leading to the question of which theory is preferable); id.at 14-25 (offering methods of
proof).
65. See Hayashi, supra note 42, at 62 (stating that gut draws partly on the subconscious to
sort complexity and bring the results to the fore). "[E]xperience enables people to chunk
information so that they can store and retrieve it easily," and helps discern categories of
categories and patterns of patterns. Id That is how people can look at the same thingespecially if it is very complex-and see different things each time; as they draw from the same
data they see different patterns. That is how the same legal decision can illuminate different
ideas at different times. Id.
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explain why it does. A master ballplayer knows that he ought to
throw the ball in a certain way, but cannot describe his thought
process in making this decision. Herbert Simon says that, "when we
use our gut we're drawing on rules and patterns that we can't quite
articulate. [We may be] aware of the result of the perception, but
we're not aware of the steps [that led to them]. "66 Intuition, he says, is
the "in-between" steps that are "mysterious only because we don't
yet understand how it works." 67 Like the master chess player, judges
have gut feelings based on unarticulated memory of the many cases
which they have decided.
Yet lawmakers, especially judges and regulators, must articulate
the reasons for their decisions in a way that would be shared with the
recipients of the information: the higher authorities and those subject
to the rules. This tension between the use of such a basis for
decisions and articulating the reasons for the decision has been, and
probably will continue to be, a fertile ground for debate.6s
The same issue was raised with respect to directors of corporations for similar reasons. To render them accountable for the
exercise of power vested in them, directors should articulate the
reasons for their decisions. But unlike judges, under the "business
judgment rule" directors need not rationalize their decisions,
provided they made these decisions without conflicts of interest, paid
attention to the issues, received adequate information, and deliberated.
In sum, while gut and reason complement each other they may
also paradoxically conflict with each other. They enhance our ability
to innovate and protect us from more serious mistakes that we are
likely to make if we choose to follow only one approach or only the
other.6
66. Id at 63.
67. Id
68. It seems that judges' gut reactions conflict with precedent and legal reasoning only in a
few cases. In some cases an analysis of the data convinces the judge of the weakness of his initial
gut reaction. Other cases involve highly individualized decisions, such as sentencing, in which
tight and specific legal guidelines may be "stretched" to harmonize with the judges' sense of
justice. Judges may face a conflict with clear precedent that brings about very offensive
results-for example, when a proven brutal murderer may be released because a confession
brutally forced by police taints all other evidence of the murder. When there is no doubt as to
the repugnance of the result, judges may seek justifications on the fringe of the precedents.
When the results are repugnant to the judges but not necessarily as clearly repugnant to others,
such a fringe justification may be criticized and probably continue to be debated for some time,
until settled by society.
69. The extent to which we should balance one approach or another is outside the scope of
this paper. However, the circumstances in which decisions can be verifiable by results, the
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III. USEFUL AND LESS USEFUL THEORIES FOR PRACITIONERS

A.

PractitionersUse Theories to Understandand Learn the Contexts
of the Problems with Which They Deal

Theorists can play the role of "expert witnesses," to facilitate
better decisions in the law. Legal practitioners are "generalists"; their
context is as broad and diverse as human actions and experiences
governed by law. Theories, like other information, educate lawyers in
the context with which they deal, and can point to questions, which
are crucial to the successful achievement of practitioners' objectives.
Because practitioners include, in addition to the bench and the bar,
enforcement agencies, regulators, legislatures, and policy makers,
theoretical works that are not helpful to one group of practitioners
may greatly help others. If theorists do not satisfy their needs,
71
practitioners do their own theorizing, 70 and so do public agencies.
Congress, for example, has a number of research arms to which it
resorts as well as "think tanks" that produce theoretical work.
B.

Theories Should Be Implemented in PracticeCautiously

Some theorists take their separateness from practices to the
extreme. They converse mostly with colleagues and write for
colleagues. They may even assert that they are speaking only among
themselves; outsiders can listen in, but not interrupt.7
Some
practitioners may reciprocate to the same degree.
While we need not go to this extreme, separating proposed
actions by theorists is not always a bad idea. While they offer ideas,
theorists are not necessarily the most suited to carry out and
implement their ideas. While theories and ideas fuel thinking and
creating, not all are necessarily suitable for real-world experience in
their original form.73 To make them work, theories may require a
extent of the decision makers' experience, and the extent to which the decision makers must
rationalize their decisions for other reasons, such as accountability, help determine the balance.
70. In the past ten years numerous law firms have produced summaries, comments, and
books prepared by their members for wide distribution. These materials also serve as
advertising for the firms' available talents.
71. The Securities and Exchange Commission often hires as its chief economist a person
from academia.
72 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separationin
CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (addressing the distinction between laws addressed
to the general public and laws addressed to public officials).
73. See Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of Schook Notes on the Transmission of Intellectual
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metamorphosis and a transition. Ideas may be the spark; but to create
a fire, wood and oxygen must be available.
Theories may not materialize in practice as expected. Theories
simplify and eliminate some details that may be crucial for successful
implementation. Theories may be based on untested assumptions
that, when proven wrong, may bring catastrophic results. In the
context of chaotic systems, such as the markets or the weather, a
small faraway event or the flutter of a feather can result in a crash or
a hurricane. One example of this type of crash is the demise of Long
Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that implemented
extraordinary ideas of theorists, some of whom were Nobel Prize
winners.74 Experience refuted one of their assumptions. Risk taking,
however, was not the exclusive province of the theorists. One of the
theorists suggested more caution, in light of the assumption, while the
business partners decided to take the risk that led to their downfall.75
More importantly, while all saw the feather fluttering, no one seems
to have predicted the hurricane until it was too late.
Another example of a theory that was not actively and quickly
adopted relates to the role of institutional investors, mainly mutual
funds, and pension funds. These institutional investors used to follow
religiously the "Wall Street Rule," which holds: if you are dissatisfied
with the performance of corporate management whose shares you
hold, then sell.76 Institutional investors were very reluctant to actively
remove the management or interfere in the operations of the
portfolio companies.
Starting about ten years ago, this subject has been the centerpiece of many scholarly works.77 Theorists urged institutional
investors to change their practice and become active in corporate
governance proper. 78 At first blush their proposed approach was
logical. In theory, institutional investors should be active shareCapitalfrom the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13 (2001).
74. See DUNBAR, supra note 40, at 182-224 (describing and analyzing the rise and fall of
the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund); id. at 203 (suggesting that the sources of
trouble were the assumptions underlying some of the theories and the automatic risk
management systems adopted by the banks, which were effective for each bank but devastating
for the system as a whole, under certain circumstances).
75. See id. at 196.
76. See Robert C. Pozen, InstitutionalInvestors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 147.
77. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITCAL
ROOTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
78. See Pozen, supra note 76, at 140.
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holders. Institutional investors are "professional shareholders."
They represent millions of small investors who hold shares in the
institutional investors' portfolios. Institutional investors are the best
choice to control errant corporate management. These investors are
the private sector regulators, certainly superior to government
regulators as well as to small investors in expertise, sophistication,
and desirable self-interest. Besides, with legal voting power in
addition to economic power, institutional investors should serve the
public and at the same time reduce government interference in
corporate affairs. As part of their function, they monitor the
corporations whose shares they hold, and have a significant amount
of information about these corporations and about others to compare
them with. The sale of a large block of shares can depress the market
price of the shares to the detriment of investors; and "dribbling"
shares into the markets may be costly and render the stock prices
uncertain. It makes sense for institutional investors as well as for the
public interest to render corporate management more efficient by
taking an active corporate governance role.
These arguments are logical. They work beautifully in theory,
but they do not pass the test of practice and experience. The
investment management industry rejected the invitation to become
active investors. Even state pension funds, the most active of the
institutional investors, refrained (after some attempts) from
appointing their representatives to corporate boards of directors.7 9
Why was the theory unhelpful in practice? Is the investment
management industry simply wrong, following the trodden road that
may have been justified years ago, but not today? I believe that, in
the view of the industry and the regulators, the cost of changing the
posture of institutional investors far exceeded the benefits. 80 The
theorists noted the costs involved in these changes, such as significant
conflicts of interest and insider trading possibility. But they did not
79. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changesbut
Uncertain Benefits, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 349, 355 (2000) ("[The] institutional investor prefers to
consider itself more as an investor than a controller.... Today, there are thousands of
institutional investors in the United States, and only a small fraction of them are regularly
involved in issues of corporate governance.").
80. See ROE, supra note 77, at 235 (advocating roles for institutions in corporate
governance including: holding managers accountable, computing the stock markets' supposed
short-term tendencies, and coordinating the long-term relational investments of corporations
that need to do business together). Roe did foresee some of his theory's limits, such as conflicts
of interest, dampening the entrepreneurial leadership, and possible increased government
involvement in financial planning. Roe did not advocate compelling ownership structures but
did advocate encouraging them. Id.

20011

OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

give these costs the weight that practitioners and regulators did. They
may have had a more benign view of, and stronger belief in, market
discipline against financial frauds than the practitioners did. The
theorists did not experience, for example, the problems of being
embroiled in the politics of appointing directors.
Further, the self-interest of the two groups differs. While the
theorists desire to produce innovative ideas, practitioners wish to
produce profits at lower risks. The risk borne by the two groups also
differs. Theorists would not bear the risks of their proposals; at most
their proposals would be rejected. The practitioners would bear the
risks of implementation; failure could be very costly to them.81
Moreover, the theorists' goal differed. The theorist aimed at
maintaining more control over corporate management.
The
institutional investors and their regulators aimed at making sure that
the institutions represent investors fairly and maintain investors' trust
in them and the system. The two groups may have had different
views of public benefits and risks involved in the changing role of
institutional investors. Theorists were not as concerned about insider
trading as institutional investors and regulators were. These
investors, whose main function is to trade in the markets, believed
that they would face serious problems of insider trading if their
representative sat on the corporations' boards.82 Institutional
investors are more active in the affairs of their portfolio corporations
when the costs of the Wall Street Rule become very expensive-when
the portfolio companies go bankrupt, for example. In such situations
the money managers do not stand idly by, but become active in the
bankruptcy process to protect their investors' interests.
CONCLUSION

Practitioners and theorists view each other as different. It is
natural for people to view what they do as most important. "Purity"
of approach supports self-worth. It limits the number of people
involved, encourages exclusivity (e.g., development of a language that
others cannot understand), and creates a distinctive closed club. 83
The divide seems to apply also to the audiences whom practitioners

81. The ideas may indeed help practitioners in other contexts, but not in this case, or not at
that time.
82. See ROE, supra note 77, at 119-20.
83. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 72, at 625.
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and theorists address. Each group tends to those who share its
attitudes and needs.
Theories and ideas are useful, even if they do not have immediate practical value. They may contribute to practice and challenge
our thinking, not only when they are true and right, but also when
they are false and wrong. Theories are useful in different ways to
different practitioners, such as legislators and other policy makers,
not only to the judges and the litigation bar. 4 All practitioners should
welcome them.85
Practices are tremendously valuable to theorists in search of
novel patterns that have escaped others. Practices are also valuable
because they preserve our attention and help develop innovative
approaches to problems. Theorists should welcome them.
Most importantly, we all need the four intellectual tools of
theory and practice, experience and gut. We need them for thinking,
remembering, paying attention, and discovering new patterns. While
these mechanisms have conflicting features, and we resort to them in
different ways, they complement each other. We cannot help but
incorporate them, use them, and value them all.

84. Edwards, supra note 1, at 34, 44, 55. Judge Edwards writes: "My argument, here,
assumes a particular audience for legal scholarship-a practitioner seeking to solve a legal
problem or a judge preparing to resolve a legal dispute." Id. at 55. But "the 'practical' scholar
should seek to integrate theory with doctrine, because both are relevant to the practitioner and
government decision-maker." Id. at 44.
85. For an insightful article on the subject, see Sternlight, supra note 1, at 707.

